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This model extends the keeping up with the Joneses (KUJ)
model to incorporate the notion that positional concerns in con-
sumption are best modelled with a reference dependence speciﬁ-
cation of preferences, as postulated by Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) in the context of riskless choice. In line with this speci-
ﬁcation, which has received substantial empirical support in the
literature, we assume that the marginal returns on the own con-
sumption are increasing below the aggregate per capita levels of
consumption (which is the reference point in our model). The
main conclusion of the paper is that in our KUJ model aggregate
consumption may be subject to sunspot ﬂuctuations and the equi-
librium level of consumption is not uniquely pinned down. The
paper also discusses the role that ﬁs c a lp o l i c yc a np l a yi no r -
der to undo the eﬀect of consumption externalities on both the
determinacy and the desirability of the equilibrium.
Keywords: Consumption externalities, keeping up with the
Joneses, reference dependence, equilibrium indeterminacy, opti-
mal taxation.
JEL codes: D11, H21.
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There is a growing recognition in the economics literature of the role of positional 
concerns in consumption (Easterlin, 1995; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Layard, 2003). A 
widely used model giving emphasis to positional concerns is the keeping up with the 
Joneses model, henceforth KUJ (Gali, 1994). This model assumes that agents derive 
utility from their own consumption as well as from the difference between their own 
and aggregate per capita consumption. This makes the marginal utility of 
consumption for each individual dependent on the aggregate level of per capita 
consumption. 
The main contribution of this paper to the existing literature on consumption 
externalities is the observation that consumption externalities essentially imply that 
agents evaluate their welfare compared with a reference point. In this respect, there is 
a large literature on the effects that reference dependence has on the functional form 
of the utility function (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). In particular, reference 
dependence preferences are characterized by  
•  Loss aversion, whereby losses (defined in terms of outcomes below the 
reference point) matter comparatively more than gains (outcomes above the 
reference point);  
•  Diminishing sensitivity, whereby marginal departures from the reference point 
are more (less) important the less (more) away they are from it.  
As a consequence of these two properties, the utility function with reference 
dependence is S-shaped, steeper below the reference point than above it, and convex 
below the reference point and concave above it. While this form of utility function has 
been mainly developed to model risky choice, Tverksy and Kahneman (1991) have 
also extended the concept to riskless choice. 
The modelling of consumption externalities with a reference dependence utility 
function introduces a kind of lexicographic preferences specification, according to 
which agents can afford to pursue leisure in addition to consumption goals only under 
the precondition that they have satisfied the minimal requirement of consuming at 
least the reference point level of consumption, owing to the convex form of the utility 
function below the reference point. In other words, the aggregate per capita level of 
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Non-technical summary consumption becomes de facto a subsistence level for our agent, where subsistence is 
defined in social and not in physical terms. 
Against this background, a main result of this paper is that under such specification of 
preferences there is no determinate solution to the consumption decision problem 
(equilibrium indeterminacy). Aggregate consumption may be affected by sunspot 
fluctuations with no underlying rationale in tastes and technology.  
In addition, our paper also deals with the optimal tax policy in an economy with KUJ 
preferences featuring reference dependence. In the framework of a standard KUJ 
model, Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) have shown that the task of tax policy is to undo 
the effect of consumption externalities and this can be accomplished by taxing 
consumption at a flat marginal rate. This solution, however, is generally insufficient 
to lead to a unique equilibrium in our case, and inefficient sunspot fluctuations may 
still arise.  
We show that in our framework the optimal tax policy has two conceptually distinct 
tasks. The first task is to concavify the utility function below the reference point by 
taxing consumption at an increasing marginal rate (progressive tax). This ensures the 
uniqueness of the equilibrium. The second task is the same as in Ljungqvist and 
Uhlig, namely to tax consumption at a flat marginal rate to ensure that the marginal 
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There is a growing recognition in the economics literature of the role of
positional concerns in consumption (Easterlin, 1995; Clark and Oswald,
1996; Layard, 2003). From a normative standpoint, consumption exter-
nalities may call for a welfare-enhancing role of government policy aimed
at undoing the eﬀect of the positional concerns and restoring the eﬃcient
level of consumption (Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000). A widely used model
giving emphasis to positional concerns is the keeping up with the Joneses
model, henceforth KUJ (Gali, 1994). This model assumes that agents
derive utility from their own consumption as well as from the diﬀerence
between their own and aggregate per capita consumption. This makes
the marginal utility of consumption for each individual dependent on
the aggregate level of per capita consumption.
The main purpose of this paper is to expand the KUJ model to
take into account an important modiﬁcation to the standard setting
which is, in our view, very plausible. Our starting point is that posi-
tional concerns almost by deﬁnition naturally imply that agents compare
themselves with a reference level of consumption. We observe that the
subject of how preferences are shaped by the presence of reference points
has been studied extensively in the literature and a large body of exper-
imental and empirical work has emerged. Importantly, it has generally
been found that the presence of reference points changes the functional
form of agents’ utility function to a signiﬁcant extent, in both risky and
riskless choice (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). In particular, reference
p o i n t sl e a d st oad i ﬀerent curvature of the utility function compared
with the standard case, whereby the utility function is steeper and con-
vex for outcomes below the reference point, and ﬂatter and concave for
outcomes above it. Since there is relatively strong evidence pointing to
this functional form, a main suggestion made in this paper is that utility
functions including positional concerns on consumption might have the
same features.
With the above as the background, we introduce a simple speciﬁ-
cation of KUJ preferences with a modiﬁed functional form in order to
take these aspects into account. A notable feature of this speciﬁcation is
that returns on consumption are increasing, rather than decreasing, for
consumption levels below the reference point. Therefore, the aggregate
per capita level of consumption becomes de facto a subsistence level of
consumption for our agent, where subsistence is deﬁn e di ns o c i a la n d
not in material terms.
The main conclusion of this paper is that under a reference depen-
dence version of the KUJ model there is no unique equilibrium con-
sumption level; rather, there may be multiple equilibria driven by non-
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agents’ animal spirits which have no foundation in changes in underlying
tastes and technology. If our line of reasoning is correct and, in particu-
lar, if reference dependence is a fair representation of positional concerns
in consumption, this result implies that agents’ concern for relative sta-
tus may have more profound eﬀects than previously recognized. Indeed,
such concerns may not only lead to an excessively high level of con-
sumption, as stressed for example by Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000); more
fundamentally, they may lead to equilibrium indeterminacy, as shown
by our analysis.
Our result is also related to the literature on endogenous business
cycles driven by sunspots initiated by Benhabib and Farmer (1994). In
Benhabib and Farmer, increasing returns and equilibrium indetermi-
nacy originate in the production side. In our case, by contrast, sunspot
ﬂuctuations are driven by the fact that the returns on consumption are
increasing below the reference point due to the psychology of consumers.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the end-result is essentially
the same.
In addition, our paper also deals with the optimal tax policy in an
economy with KUJ preferences featuring reference dependence. In the
framework of a standard KUJ model, Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) have
shown that the task of tax policy is to undo the eﬀect of consumption
externalities and this can be accomplished by taxing consumption at a
ﬂat marginal rate. This solution, however, is generally insuﬃcient to
lead to a unique equilibrium in our case, and ineﬃcient sunspot ﬂuctu-
ations may still arise. We show that in our framework the optimal tax
policy has two conceptually distinct tasks. The ﬁrst task is to concavify
the utility function below the reference point by taxing consumption at
an increasing marginal rate (progressive tax). This ensures the unique-
ness of the equilibrium, in line with similar remarks in the literature on
Benhabib-Farmer type of business cycles (Guo and Lansing, 1998; Chris-
tiano and Harrison, 1999). The second task is the same as in Ljungqvist
and Uhlig, namely to tax consumption at a ﬂat marginal rate to ensure
that the marginal utility of consumption is reduced to the level which
would prevail with no consumption externalities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the standard
KUJ model and recalls the determinants of equilibrium consumption in
this setting. A KUJ model with reference dependence preferences is
then introduced in Section 3. Section 4 describes the equilibrium in this
model. Section 5 contains some considerations on the optimal tax policy
in this framework. Section 6 concludes.
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ses model: the standard speciﬁcation
Positional concerns in consumption have received some attention in the
recent literature (Easterlin, 1995; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998) and
may also have important economic policy implications (Ljungqvist and
Uhlig, 2000; Layard, 2003).1 Importantly, research ﬁndings show that
positional concerns have important eﬀects on consumption but little, if
any, on leisure (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Layard, 2003). This implies
that positional concerns may lead to an increase in the marginal utility
of consumption at the aggregate level. As a result, society as a whole
may suﬀer from overconsumption (Schor, 1998).
Reﬂecting these considerations, the KUJ model introduced by Gali
(1994) postulates that — owing to positional concerns in consumption —
the marginal utility of consumption of each economic agent is higher, the
higher aggregate consumption. To represent the main idea behind KUJ
preferences, we assume that a representative consumer-producer has an
utility function with the following general speciﬁcation:
u = V (c,C) − βc, (1)
where c is own consumption, C the per capita aggregate consumption,
and Vc > 0,V cc < 0, and VcC > 0 (consumption externality). The latter
assumption is the crucial one in the KUJ model as it implies a comple-
mentarity between own and aggregate consumption.2 The parameter β
captures the disutility of the work eﬀort associated with consumption,
and depends on both the relative importance of leisure in the utility
function and the prevailing technology (for example, technical progress
allows the agent to economize in work eﬀort for each consumption level
c, which implies a lower level of β). It should be noted that, as in
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), we are assuming that the marginal disu-
t i l i t yo fw o r ke ﬀort is constant. This assumption is a plausible one if we
are modelling levels of work eﬀort which might be thought as "normal",
but of course becomes completely unrealistic for very high work eﬀort
levels, for which the marginal dis-utility should be strongly increasing
and ultimately go to inﬁnity. This implies that the results of this study
are plausible and interesting only for normal levels of work eﬀort, and
t h i si sac a v e a tt h a ts h o u l db ek e p ti nm i n di nt h ec o n t i n u a t i o n .
1Older classic references are Duesenberry (1949) and Hirsch (1976).
2It should be mentioned that the KUJ model is conceptually diﬀerent from a model
featuring jealousy (Dupor and Liu, 2003). The KUJ model makes an assumption on
the marginal utility of consumption given aggregate consumption, while jealousy is
an assumption on the utility level.
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of consumption by each agent will be higher, the higher the aggregate
level of consumption:
c
∗ =a r gm a x [ V (c,C) − βc]=r(C), (2)
where rC > 0.
At the aggregate level and assuming a symmetric solution where all




The conditions under which the condition (3) leads to a determinate
solution are spelled out in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 If, for C ⊂ D, where D is a subset of the domain of C,
rC ≥ 1, then the equilibrium is a sink and multiple equilibria may arise
in D. Otherwise, if for all Cr C < 1, then the equilibrium is a saddle
and multiplicity does not arise.
Proof. It follows directly from the ﬁxed point relationship in (3) (see
Farmer, 1999).
It is interesting to note that Proposition 1 illustrates that the KUJ
model may lead to equilibrium indeterminacy. Intuitively, this may hap-
pen if a sunspot change in aggregate consumption prompts a propor-
tional (or more than proportional) rise in individual consumption, which
then makes the initial change in aggregate consumption self-fulﬁlling.
So, the KUJ model has the potential to create self-fulﬁlling ﬂuctuations
in consumption. It is worth noting that this possibility has not been
adequately emphasized in the literature and most KUJ models have fo-
cused on speciﬁcations of the utility function, such as power or loglinear,
where multiple equilibria do not arise. However, as we argue in the next
section, there may be reasons to believe that a speciﬁcation of the KUJ
model which is realistic from a behavioural standpoint does give rise to
equilibrium indeterminacy. Hence, and this the main point of our pa-
per, we argue that consumption externalities may create self-fulﬁlling
ﬂuctuations in consumption levels.
3Note that we consider, as in Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), only symmetric equi-
libria in this paper. Hence, we do not discuss possible issues arising from agents’
heterogeneity as regards tastes and productivity.
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pendence
Positional concerns imply that agents evaluate their consumption level
relative to a reference point, which in the KUJ model is taken to be the
aggregate per capita level of consumption. So, we argue that preferences
including positional concerns lend themselves very well to be modelled
as reference dependence preferences.
There is in fact a large literature on the eﬀects that reference de-
pendence has on the functional form of the utility function, and such
eﬀects have been conﬁrmed in a large number of studies (for a review of
this literature see, in particular, Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). In this
framework, there are two features which may be particularly important
in our modelling of positional concerns in consumption. First, refer-
ence dependence preferences are characterized by loss aversion,w h e r e b y
losses (deﬁned in terms of outcomes below the reference point) matter
comparatively more than gains (outcomes above the reference point) in
the utility function. Second, and more relevant for the present analysis,
marginal departures from the reference point are more (less) important
the less (more) away they are from it (diminishing sensitivity). As a
consequence of these two properties, the utility function is S-shaped,
namely steeper below the reference point than above it, and it is convex
below the reference point and concave above it. The reference depen-
dence utility function looks like the one shown in Fig. 1 above.
Reference dependence is a concept traditionally associated with agents’
preference to maintain the status quo (endowment eﬀect), and most ex-
perimental evidence has been derived by assuming the status quo to be
the reference point. However, reference dependence is a much broader
concept than just the preference for the status quo. This was empha-
sized in particular by Tversky and Kahneman (1991), who introduced
the concept of reference dependence in riskless choice.4 According to
Tversky and Kahneman,
although the reference state usually corresponds to the
decision maker’s current position, it can also be inﬂuenced
by aspirations, expectations, norms, and social comparisons
(page 1046-1047, emphasis ours)
To our knowledge, there is no empirical analysis available testing di-
rectly whether social comparisons give rise to the kind of S-shaped value
function typically observed in experimental studies when other types of
4For a forceful criticism of the narrow interpretation of reference dependence as
the endowment eﬀect, see also Koszegi and Rabin (2004).
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Figure 1: Traditional form of the reference dependence utility function.
reference points, such as standards of value, are given to agents. This is
related to the fact that the behavioural economics literature, of which
reference dependence and S-shaped preferences are key elements, and the
literature on relative utility and positional concerns have evolved quite
independently of each other. Nonetheless, it appears relatively straight-
forward to assume that utility functions including social comparisons
may be characterized by the same type of S-shaped form observed in ex-
perimental studies when agents compared their welfare with some other
type of standard, e.g. the status quo. In fact, it should be emphasized
that what gives rise to the S-shaped form of utility highlighted by Tver-
sky and Kahneman is the comparison with a given standard of value,
irrespective of its concrete determination, as illustrated for example in
the above quote from their 1991 paper. In our model, the standard of
value is based on a social comparison with total per capita consumption.5
With these considerations in mind, we ﬁnd it very plausible to assume
that the utility function for each agent is S-shaped, namely convex below
the level of per capita aggregate consumption C and concave above it.
This implies that the marginal utility of own consumption is increasing
5These considerations are not to deny, of course, that direct empirical evidence
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disutility of the work eﬀort is constant (as in our model) or not very
strongly increasing, agents will want to pursue the reference level of
consumption no matter its costs in terms of higher work eﬀort.
The basic idea is that agents are willing to push themselves to the
limit because they cannot aﬀord (in social terms) to be left behind the
per capita aggregate consumption level. This introduces a kind of lexi-
cographic preferences speciﬁcation, according to which agents can aﬀord
to pursue leisure in addition to consumption goals only under the pre-
condition that they have satisﬁed the minimal requirement of consuming
at least the reference point level of consumption. In other words, the
aggregate per capita level of consumption becomes de facto a subsis-
tence level for our agent, where subsistence is deﬁned in social and not
in physical terms.
It is interesting that the idea that returns associated to positional
c o n c e r n sm a yb ei n s a t i a b l ea so p p o s e dt ot h o s ed e r i v e df r o mt h ea b -
solute level of consumption, which are satiable, was recognized already
by Keynes (1930), as evident in this citation:
Now it is true that the needs of human beings may seem to be
insatiable. But they fall into two classes - those needs which are absolute
in the sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our fellow
human beings may be, and those which are relative in the sense that we
feel them only if their satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior
to, our fellows. Needs of the second class, those which satisfy the desire
for superiority, may indeed be insatiable; for the higher the general
level, the higher still are they. But this is not so true of the absolute
needs - a point may soon be reached, much sooner perhaps than we are
all of us aware of, when these needs are satisﬁed in the sense that we
prefer to devote our further energies to non-economic purposes. J. M.
Keynes, Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren, 1930 [emphasis
ours]
Looking at the more recent literature, our model is also related to
that by Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999) (henceforth BMR), who
assume habit formation in consumption based on a reference dependence
speciﬁcation of preferences. The similarity between BMR and this work
is in the fact that consumption is evaluated relative to a standard of
value, and not (only) in absolute terms. There is, however, a key dif-
ference the BMR model and ours. BMR assume the reference point to
b et h ep a s tl e v e lo ft h eown consumption (habit formation), while we
are interested in positional concerns, i.e. in the own consumption level
relative to that by others at the same point in time. Moreover, BMR
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case with our model. Alonso-Carrera, Caballe and Raurich (2004) also
have a model with consumption externalities, but again their focus is
on dynamic equilibrium, rather than intratemporal choice. In addition,
Alonso-Carrera, Caballe and Raurich do not mention the possible non-
concavities which may be associated with consumption externalities.
Operationally, we specify our assumptions about preferences as a
general utility function:
u = V (c,C) − βc (4)
where, as before, VcC > 0,V cc < 0 if c>C , but (unlike in the baseline
speciﬁcation) Vcc < 0 if c ≤ C. This implies that, for c<C , the existence
of positional concerns implies thatt h er e t u r n so nt h eo w nc o n s u m p t i o n
are increasing if individual consumption is below aggregate per capita
consumption. This creates a convexity in the utility function for a region
of the consumption possibilities which implies that the condition c ≥ C
becomes a binding constraint, and c−C plays the role of "supernumary"
consumption (i.e. consumption in excess of the required level).
Hence, the maximization of the utility function in (4) is the optimal
consumption level c∗ satisfying
c
∗ =a r gm a x
c≥C
V (c,C) − βc (5)
4 Determination of the equilibrium under reference
dependence
As in Section 2, the optimal level of the own consumption c∗ will be an
increasing function r(C) of C as well as satisfy the condition that
c
∗ ≥ C (6)
As noted, if c<Ceach agent will always want to bring his own con-
sumption at least to C, because returns on consumption are increasing
below the reference point. This implies that rc(C)=1for all c ≤ C.
These considerations lead to:
Proposition 2 Under a reference dependence speciﬁcation of KUJ pref-
erences as in (4), the symmetric equilibrium solution is characterized by
a sunspot component subject to the restriction that b ≥ 0.H e n c e ,t h e r e
is an inﬁnite number of equilibria characterized by a positive sunspot
component in the consumption level.
14
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where the superscript + indicates the positive derivative (for C ≥
C∗) ,a n dt h i si sv a l i df o ra n yC∗. This implies that, if C∗ is an equilibrium
level of consumption, C∗ + b, where b>0, must also be an equilibrium.
Hence, equilibrium indeterminacy is obtained.
The key message of Proposition 2 is that there is no determinate
solution to the consumption decision problem.I n t u i t i v e l y , t h i s i s e x -
plained by the observation that in a reference dependence speciﬁcation
of preferences individual agents have to keep up with aggregate con-
sumption, owing to the convex form of the utility function below the
reference point. Under these assumptions, any aggregate consumption
immediately becomes the subsistence level for each agent and therefore
self-fulﬁlling. This also implies that attempting to derive agents’ tastes
and technology from their observed consumption and work eﬀort would
be diﬃcult, as actual consumption and labour supply behaviour might
well be driven by sunspots.
How realistic and relevant is the set-up of this model to explain con-
sumption in reality? Of course, the assumption of identical consumers,
while of analytical convenience, is not very plausible. Real consumers
are characterized by heterogeneity in tastes, endowments, standards of
value, and so on.6 Nevertheless, we believe that despite its simpliﬁca-
tions our model may still be capturing dynamics which are plausible
and relevant. Assume, for example, the more realistic situation in which
each agent compares his consumption to that of his reference group,
and that the consumption level of the reference group becomes the re-
quired standard for individuals. For example, agents may compare their
consumption to that in their neighborhood, or in their workplace. As
long as there are standards of consumption which become mandatory
in agents preference due to the functional form of the utility function
in the presence of reference points, the consumption of each group (and
hence of the economy as a whole) may remain subject to sunspot ﬂuc-
tuations. Therefore, the simple analytical framework developed in this
paper appears to have something interesting to say about this type of
process.
Interestingly, the result of Proposition 2 has a lot in common with the
idea of endogenous business cycles introduced by Benhabib and Farmer
6See Falk and Knell (2004) for an interesting analysis of the choice of endogenous
reference standards for diﬀerent groups of agents.
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tions caused by increasing returns in the production side. In Benhabib
and Farmer, because there are increasing returns to scale at society’s
level, agents may coordinate on "good" (high activity) as well as on
"bad" (low activity) equilibria which become self-fulﬁlling. By contrast,
in our study, multiple equilibria and sunspots arise from consumers’ con-
cerns for relative status, which creates strong complementarity among
them. Of course, Benhabib and Farmer’s and our theory are not mutu-
ally exclusive and may actually reinforce each other in leading to multiple
equilibria and sunspot ﬂuctuations in aggregate consumption.
In our view, the result of Proposition 2 may be highly relevant from
both a positive and a normative standpoint. First and foremost, it may
help to explain ongoing consumption developments in a very diﬀerent
way compared with alternative approaches. Although the role of a sta-
tic model (such as that proposed in this paper) is necessarily limited to
explain dynamics, we believe that the idea that sunspots drive aggregate
consumption may turn out to be relevant and useful on some occasions,
for observers and policy-makers alike. Notably, consumption ﬂuctuations
driven by sunspots may respond to policy stimuli in a very diﬀerent way
than ﬂuctuations driven by tastes and technology which can be derived
from traditional models. For instance, in a model with equilibrium in-
determinacy the role of economic policy might be more useful in leading
economic agents to coordinate on a certain equilibrium, say by means of
a careful use of communication, than by providing incentives which are
directly able to pin down equilibrium outcomes.
From a a more normative perspective, it has to be emphasized that
the multiplicity of equilibria created by reference dependence may lead
to an upward bias in consumption levels, but in no case to a downward
bias, due to the functional form of the utility function in the presence
of reference points. This creates a fundamental asymmetry in aggregate
consumption and, indirectly, in labour supply. We then analyze the
normative implications of this result in the next section.
5 Can tax policy restore the uniqueness and eﬃ-
ciency of the equilibrium?
As discussed in detail by Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), positional con-
cerns in consumption represent a negative externality leading to higher
equilibrium consumption than socially eﬃcient. This creates a scope for
government intervention aimed at correcting the eﬀects of the external-
ity.
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) show that in the context of a KUJ model
the government can restore the ﬁrst best level of consumption by using
16
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cerns about relative status on consumption (and labour eﬀort) choices is
felt through a higher marginal utility of consumption (than otherwise).
Let uc be the marginal utility of consumption which would obtain if
VcC =0 , i.e. if there were no complementarity between own and aggre-
gate consumption. Since, as shown by Ljungqvist and Uhlig, the eﬃcient
level of consumption is that obtained when the marginal utility of con-
sumption is uc, the government can optimally introduce a tax schedule
on consumption t(c) such that:
uc = Vc(c − t(c),C) − βc = uc (9)
Ljungqvist and Uhlig show that in a power-linear utility speciﬁcation
of the KUJ model this result can be obtained through proportional taxes
which are redistributed to agents in lump sum transfers. In that model,
the optimal tax schedule is:
t(c)=k + τc, (10)
where τ>0 is a scalar and k<0 ensures that the overall net eﬀect of
the tax on the ﬁnancial wealth of the private sector is zero. Intuitively,
the eﬀect of the tax is to reduce the marginal utility of consumption
by an amount exactly equal to the importance attributed to positional
concerns, with the result that the eﬀect of positional concerns is fully
corrected for. This tax policy results in a Pareto improvement in that
each agent is made better oﬀ by it.
However, when reference dependence comes into play, the linear tax
policy proposed by Ljungqvist and Uhlig alone is unlikely to lead to the
eﬃcient level of consumption, apart from the very special case in which,
by chance, b =0 .T h i si sd u et ot h ef a c tt h a tac o n s t a n tm a r g i n a lt a xr a t e
may have little eﬀect on the curvature of the utility function below the
reference point, which will generally remain convex. As a consequence,
the equilibrium consumption will still be aﬀected by sunspot ﬂuctuations
which would put it above the eﬃcient level of consumption. How can
tax policy cope with this additional challenge?
Intuitively, the task of leading to a determinate solution can be ac-
complished by a progressive tax schedule. Indeed, in the context of en-
dogenous business cycles driven by increasing returns in production in
the spirit of Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Guo and Lansing (1998) and
Christiano and Harrison (1999) have found that a progressive tax system
can undo the eﬀect of increasing returns and lead to a unique equilib-
rium. In our model, however, returns on individual consumption are
increasing only for c<Cand not for c ≥ C, so there is no need for a
17
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level of consumption. This suggests that the optimal tax schedule is
likely to be progressive only for consumption levels below the aggregate
per capita consumption C.
These considerations lead to the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Let uc be the eﬃcient marginal utility of consumption,
which would obtain if VcC =0 , Vcc < 0 everywhere, and let C be the
corresponding aggregate per capita level of consumption. A tax schedule




V (c − t(c),C) − βc, (11)
is the eﬃcient level of consumption C.
Suﬃcient conditions for a tax schedule to be optimal are: (1) that
the utility function V (c−t(c),C)−βc is concave everywhere (concaviﬁ-
cation); (2) that Vc(c−t(c),C)−β = uc for any c (undoing of positional
concerns).
The intuition of Proposition 3 is that the optimal tax policy can be
deﬁn e di nt w oc o n c e p t u a l l ys e p a r a t es t e p s .I nt h eﬁr s ts t e p ,t h ef u n c t i o n
of the tax schedule t(c) is to concavify the overall utility function of the
agent. The only way to do so is to make t(c) a (possibly highly) convex
function for c<C ,s ot h a tV (c − t(c),C) becomes a concave function.
Once this ﬁrst result is accomplished, the second task of the optimal
tax policy is to ensure that the marginal utility of consumption for each
agent is equal to its ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e luc. Of course, this distinction is
for illustrative purposes only since, in practice, the same non-linear tax
policy t(c) might accomplish both objectives in one go.
These considerations point to a tax system which is highly progres-
sive at relatively low levels of consumption with an increasing marginal
tax rate. Above the per capita level of consumption, a constant mar-
ginal tax rate is suﬃcient to achieve a ﬁrst best level of consumption.
I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,t h i sa p p e a r st ob ec l o s et ot h ei n c o m et a xs y s t e m sp r e v a i l -
ing in most industrialized countries, which are typically very progressive
at low income levels but with a relatively ﬂat marginal tax rate after a
certain income threshold. Although the undoing of positional concerns
is arguably not an explicit rationale of the existing tax systems, it is
interesting to note that the type of redistribution they imply might have
quite favorable properties from the standpoint of countering the eﬀects
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This paper has studied the eﬀect of reference dependence in riskless
choice (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) on the determination of equilib-
rium consumption in a model where agents are concerned about con-
sumption by others. This speciﬁcation of preferences implies that the
aggregate per capita level of consumption becomes a subsistence level
for each agent, where subsistence has a social rather than physical di-
mension.
The main result of this paper is that, under this (in our view quite
realistic) setting, aggregate consumption may be subject to multiple
equilibria and be driven by sunspot ﬂuctuations, although it is reason-
able to expect that such ﬂuctuations would happen within limits, i.e. at
not too high levels of work eﬀort where the marginal dis-utility of work is
likely to be strongly increasing. The result about equilibrium indetermi-
nacy has positive (the potential to explain consumption developments)
as well as normative (the optimal tax policy) implications that may be
quite important.
The main lesson that we draw from this analysis is that it is realistic
to expect that positional concerns in consumption may have more pro-
found and disturbing eﬀects than previously thought. Not only would
they aﬀect the desirability of the equilibrium, leading — if uncorrected —
to overconsumption compared with the ﬁrst-best situation (Ljungqvist
and Uhlig, 2000). According to our analysis, they might also create the
conditions for sunspot ﬂuctuations, unrelated to fundamentals, to drive
equilibrium consumption. This might make the case for public interven-
tion in dampening the eﬀect of this type of negative externalities even
more compelling than typically recognized (see the interesting discussion
on this matter in Layard, 2003).
Our results might also shed a new light on the eﬀects that factors
like advertising and, more in general, social norms have on the actual
aggregate level of consumption. Since in our model the aggregate level
of consumption is indeterminate (at least to the extent that it is not
adequately corrected for by tax policy), it may be interesting to speculate
whether factors which are external to the model can act as catalyst for
the selection of a particular equilibrium. For example, the advertising
industry may have an obvious interest in raising the aspiration level of
consumers by representing ﬁctitious agents who have a (very) high level
of consumption. In a standard model and if agents are rational (so that
they can discount the incentives of the advertising industry), this has
no eﬀect on aggregate consumption. But in a model where equilibrium
consumption is not pinned down by tastes and preferences and is driven
by sunspots, we believe that factors such as advertising might have a
19
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